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The superτ-charm facility (STCF) is an electron–positron collider proposed by the Chinese particle physics community. It is designed to operate in a center-of-mass energy range from 2 to 7 GeV with a peak luminosity of 0.5 × 10³⁵cm⁻²·s⁻¹or higher. The STCF will produce a data sample about a factor of 100 larger than that of the presentτ-charm factory — the BEPCII, providing a unique platform for exploring the asymmetry of matter-antimatter (charge-parity violation), in-depth studies of the internal structure of hadrons and the nature of non-perturbative strong interactions, as well as searching for exotic hadrons and physics beyond the Standard Model. The STCF project in China is under development with an extensive R&D program. This document presents the physics opportunities at the STCF, describes conceptual designs of the STCF detector system, and discusses future plans for detector R&D and physics case studies.

 

In this paper, a signature-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is developed to detect cyber intrusions of a distribution system with a high level penetration of solar energy. To identify cyberattack events, an attack table is constructed based on the Temporal Failure Propagation Graph (TFPG) technique. It includes the information of potential cyberattack patterns in terms of attack types and time sequence of anomaly events. Once the detected anomaly events are matched with any of the predefined attack patterns, it is judged to be a cyberattack. Since the attack patterns are distinguishable from other system failures, it reduces the false positive rate. To study the impact of cyberattacks on solar devices and validate the performance of the proposed IDS, a realistic Cyber-Physical System (CPS) simulation environment available at Virginia Tech (VT) is used to develop an interconnection between the cyber and power system models. The CPS model demonstrates how communication system anomalies can impact the physical system. The results of two example cyberattack test cases are obtained with the IEEE 13 node test feeder system and the power system simulator, DIgSILENT PowerFactory. 

The fast-growing installation of solar PVs has a significant impact on the operation of distribution systems. Grid-tied solar inverters provide reactive power capability to support the voltage profile in a distribution system. In comparison with traditional inverters, smart inverters have the capability of real time remote control through digital communication interfaces. However, cyberattack has become a major threat with the deployment of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in a smart grid. The past cyberattack incidents have demonstrated how attackers can sabotage a power grid through digital communication systems. In the worst case, numerous electricity consumers can experience a major and extended power outage. Unfortunately, tracking techniques are not efficient for today’s advanced communication networks. Therefore, a reliable cyber protection system is a necessary defense tool for the power grid. In this paper, a signature-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is developed to detect cyber intrusions of a distribution system with a high level penetration of solar energy. To identify cyberattack events, an attack table is constructed based on the Temporal Failure Propagation Graph (TFPG) technique. It includes the information of potential cyberattack patterns in terms of attack types and time sequence of anomaly events. Once the detected anomaly events are matched with any of the predefined attack patterns, it is judged to be a cyberattack. Since the attack patterns are distinguishable from other system failures, it reduces the false positive rate. To study the impact of cyberattacks on solar devices and validate the performance of the proposed IDS, a realistic Cyber-Physical System (CPS) simulation environment available at Virginia Tech (VT) is used to develop an interconnection between the cyber and power system models. The CPS model demonstrates how communication system anomalies can impact the physical system. The results of two example cyberattack test cases are obtained with the IEEE 13 node test feeder system and the power system simulator, DIgSILENT PowerFactory. 

A search for decays to invisible particles of Higgs bosons produced in association with a top-antitop quark pair or a vector boson, which both decay to a fully hadronic final state, has been performed using proton-proton collision data collected at$${\sqrt{s}=13\,\text {Te}\hspace{-.08em}\text {V}}$$$\sqrt{s}=13\text{Te}\text{V}$by the CMS experiment at the LHC, corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 138$$\,\text {fb}^{-1}$$${\text{fb}}^{-1}$. The 95% confidence level upper limit set on the branching fraction of the 125$$\,\text {Ge}\hspace{-.08em}\text {V}$$$\text{Ge}\text{V}$Higgs boson to invisible particles,$${\mathcal {B}({\textrm{H}} \rightarrow \text {inv})}$$$B(\text{H}\to \text{inv})$, is 0.54 (0.39 expected), assuming standard model production cross sections. The results of this analysis are combined with previous$${\mathcal {B}({\textrm{H}} \rightarrow \text {inv})}$$$B(\text{H}\to \text{inv})$searches carried out at$${\sqrt{s}=7}$$$\sqrt{s}=7$, 8, and 13$$\,\text {Te}\hspace{-.08em}\text {V}$$$\text{Te}\text{V}$in complementary production modes. The combined upper limit at 95% confidence level on$${\mathcal {B}({\textrm{H}} \rightarrow \text {inv})}$$$B(\text{H}\to \text{inv})$is 0.15 (0.08 expected).